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1.  Introduction
Ethnic  diversity,  war, and  civil conflict  have recently been "re-discovered"  by economists  as important
determinants  of economic  outcomes  and overall development  (Stewart 2000).  One  of the key reasons is
that it  is now realized  that "state  failure"  or weakness,  often brought  about by civil unrest,  can be  an
important impediment to social and economic development.  However, empirical  support for the relevance
of these factors largely rests  on cross-country  regressions  which  generally provide  insufficient  detail on
the factors at work in order to support policy conclusions.  Limitations of data-availability  and -quality are
of particular relevance for crisis-tom states in Africa where dealing with this phenomenon is of particular
urgency. In-depth  analysis of the factors  causing civil  strife, the scope  for policies to prevent it,  and the
potential economic consequences  of this phenomenon  in Africa would be of great importance.
In this paper we use micro-data for Uganda to explore causes  of civil conflict in an attempt to gain insight
into both causes and economic  consequences  of civil  strife.  We use a stylized model  that assumes  that
rebels decide whether or not to initiate  activity in a given community based on the potential tax revenue,
the pre-existing  level  of "resistance",  the presence  of economic  infrastructure,  and  the wage  rate they
need to offer to potential recruits. Based on these parameters,  individuals decide on whether or not to join
the rebels and,  subsequent to receiving  their income  for the period, make  decisions on investment.  Even
though the model requires  an abstraction from the complex history of armed struggle in Uganda and the
intricacies of changing  coalitions,  it provides  policy-relevant  predictions  that can  be tested  empirically.For example, the model implies that rebel activity will be higher in areas with high levels of pre-existing
grievance,  a high  level of assets  thal  can be taxed easily,  limited altemative  economic  opportunities  as
proxied by a lack of infiastructure,  and availability of a large pool of uneducated potential recruits.  Also,
since individuals'  investment decisions are affected by the presence  of civil strife, our model predicts that
communities with higher levels of civil strife will be characterized  by lower investment and a lower level
of non-agricultural  business  startups,  factors  thlat are often  assumed to be crucial  for broader economic
growth.
These predictions  are tested  with community-level  and household  level data from Uganda  spanning the
1992-2000  period which include information  en the incidence of civil  strife (as well as physical violence
and theft) and possible determinants  of  these phenomena  at the cormmunity level. This allows to probe for
determinants  of these  phenomena  and,  by  using  the  panel  eleraent  of the  data,  changes  over  time.
Replicating  the  cross-sectional  regressions regarding  incidence  of civil  strife performed  in most of the
cross-country  literature  confirms  the  basic  validity of the  model.  Lack  of human  capital,  presence  of
taxable and immobile wealth,  infrastructure access,  and to some extent ethnic fractionalization,  emerge as
the main factors  contributing to higher levels of civil  strife. Use of the panel element  in a subset of the
communities,  and exploration of factors  leading to increases in the incidence of civil  strife, confirmTs  the
validity of this finding but also points towards  strong persistence  of conflict over time, a clear  conflict-
reducing impact of  govemrment provision of infrastructure,  and a strong role of households'  perceptions.
This  overall  finding,  as well  as  the  quantitative  magnitude  of the  estimated coefficients,  suggest that,
somewhat contrary to traditional models that focus on "greed" as a key determinant of civil strife, lack of
economic development is a key factor that increases the incidence of civil strife, contrary to what is found
for theft  and physical  violence.  Government  policies  to  raise  the  opportunity  cost  of labor  e.g.  by
improving  education  and  infrastructure  woulid  have  a  clear negative  impact on the propensity  towards
civil strife, in addition to their direct economic benefits.
2A  second  and  related  question  that  has  been  difficult to  address  with  aggregate  data  relates  to  the
economic impact of civil conflict.  Our model predicts that, by reducing households'  investment and their
diversification  into  non-farm  businesses,  civil  strife  would  have  a decidedly  negative  impact  on  an
economy's  growth performance.  This  is confirmed  by the data  at hand,  both at the  individual  and  the
community level. In addition to standard factors including household characteristics  such as initial human
and physical capital  endowments, civil strife (again in contrast to theft and physical violence)  emerges as
a  significant  impediment  to  investment  that  is  of significant  magnitude.  Moreover,  in line  with  the
hypothesis  that violence will bias individual producers and the economy as a whole towards subsistence
and against  activities that require  integration  into broader markets,  we find that presence  of civil  strife
reduces the propensity to start up new enterprises  and makes it more likely that those which had already
been established go out of business.
These  results support  the view that,  in Uganda as well as other African countries  that have  successfully
emerged from a long period of conflict, politically motivated internal violence continues  to pose a danger
to  sustained economic  recovery.  The  scope for persistence  of civil conflict  imply that failure  to contain
such violence may well lead to a downward spiral whereby,  in some areas, lack of economic development
and productive infrastructure increase the propensity towards violence which in turn increase the region's
attractiveness for rebel activity and recruitment, providing further disincentives to investment and broader
economic growth.
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows:  Section  two reviews  the  literature,  provides  a  conceptual  model,
discusses  definitions  and sources  of data,  as  well  as a  number of descriptive  statistics.  The  empirical
approach  is discussed  in  section  three.  Section  four  discusses  the results  obtained  and  some possible
implications. Section five concludes by highlighting some avenues for further research.
32.  Literature, conceptual  background, and descriptive  statistics
Determinants of violence and its impact on economic variables have recently become of increased interest
in both the theoretical  and empirical literature.  Two questions are of central relevance in this context. One
is how to  define  civil strife, as distinct from other forms  of violence.  This includes an assessment  of the
extent to which civil  strife responds  to  econormic  ince:ntives  and thus may be  amenable  to govermnent
policies  aiming to reduce  its incidence.  A second  quesion  is to what  extent civil  strife is of economic
relevance  and how its  impact  on economic  behavior  can  be identified  at more  disaggregate  levels  of
analysis  than have been  applied  in the  past.  not only at  the  aggregate  but  also  at  the household  level.
Uganda is of interest in  this respect  not only because  of its long history  of civil  conflict but primarily
because the availability of household data allows us to develop indi.cators  for the incidence of violence  at
lower levels of aggregation that provide a basis for more specific answers to these questions.
2.1  Review  of the literature
The economic  profession has  recently not only  re-emphasized  the imnportance  of institutions  (e.g. Aron
2000)  but  also  re-discovered  civil  conflict,  violence  and  crime  as  factors  that  may  have  important
repercussions  on economic  growth.  One  strand of the literature  focuses  on determinants  and impact  of
personal  crime, focusing on causes such as inequality in the distribation of resources, the possible impact
of govermnent deterrence efforts, and the broad er economic relevance  of these phenomena (see Lederman
et al, 1998; Bourguignon 1999;  Gavirira 2000). A second strand emphasized internal wars and civil strife,
a category of conflicts that appears to be particularly endemic in poor African countries,  with potentially
very  negative  consequences  for economic  growth.  To  this  date,  most  of the  literature  in  the  second
category has  focused on indicators  of violence  at the national  level  such  as these  by  Singer and  Small
(1994)  which  may  be  appropriate  from  a  political  science  perspective  but  can  be  improved  upon
considerably from an economic point of view.2
2Singer and  Small define  conflicts  as a civil war if (i)  at least one of the parties  involved  is the national  govermment;  (ii) there  is some hann
inflicted  on the  stronger forces (at least 5% of the fatalities  suffered by the weaker forces);  (iii) there  are at least  1,000 battle-related  deaths,  and
4In this second context,  the literature has identified three key variables affecting the incidence of civil war,
namely  (i)  the  conflict  technology;  (ii)  the  value  of the prize,  i.e.  the  amount  of resources  that  are
associated  with  "winning"  the  conflict and  which could then be used to sustain  fighting;  and (iii)  the
presence of non-economic  factors  such as tribal identities,  historical injustices,  and ideologies  that can to
motivate  fighters,  thereby  reducing the  cost of continuing  conflict  on either  side.  Contributions  to the
theoretical  literature have used these parameters  to provide a general  model of civil conflict  and predict
conditions  under which  different outcomes  will  be observed  in practice,  to distinguish  between  central
and  decentralized  rulers,  when rebellions  are  likely to  occur,  and  to  highlight when  it is  likely that
"victory" by one party will end a conflict rather than have it continue to linger under the surface, and what
factors can reduce the risk of a re-ignition of conflict after a truce had been established  (Bigombe et al.
2000; Grossman  1991  and 2001; Kuran  1993, Horowitz  1993).
Concerning  the  impact  of  violence,  four  possible  channels  through  which  civil  strife  might  affect
economic outcomes have traditionally been identified.  First, and most immediately,  there is destruction of
private  and public  physical  capital  such as  factories,  roads,  and  other assets.  Through  reduced  capital
formation  as well as diversion  of scarce resources  from more  productive  activities,  these factors would
contribute to a direct  decline in output (Bourguignon  1999; Skaperdas  1992).  A second factor is that, by
contributing  to  social  disorder  and promoting  the  destruction  of social  capital,  civil  strife  is likely  to
increase  the  transaction  costs  involved  in economic  exchange,  thereby  either forcing  households  into
greater autarky or reducing the size of trading networks.  This often leads to a shift of economic  activity
from "war vulnerable" to "war invulnerable"  sectors (Collier,  1999). Third, at a more aggregate  level, the
insecurity  that goes along with civil strife leads to dis-investment  or diversion and expatriation  of assets
by private  households  (Collier  et al.  2001).  Finally,  to the  extent  that  government will  have to spend
resources  to  deal  with internal  uprising,  doing  so  will  divert  public  spending  from  activities  such  as
(iv) the war is intemal to the country, i.e. excluding a country and dependent territories.  This definition  limits the scope for analyzing variation in
the incidence of violence within one country.education and the provision of infrastructure which directly enhance  the economy's capital stock towards
relatively unproductive purposes such as maintaining armies and procuring weaponry.
While the conceptual  basis for these relationships  is relatively  straightforward,  empirical  work has been
constrained  by the problem of finding  appropriate proxies  for the variables  of interest and the  limited
scope to account for possible interactions. 3 The most  comprehensive  empirical  model  to  date combines
three factors,  namely (i)  economic  or "greed"  factors  such as the presence  and size  of primary  exports,
population density, and the availability of a firancially potent dias-pora that can finance the sustenance of
at least one of the warring parties;  (ii) social  f1actors causing "grievance"  or making it easier to feel  and
express grievance  such as ethnic dominance,  social fraLctionalization,  demography,  and inequality  in the
access to resources; and (iii) factors relating to "conflicl: technologye' or "cost" in the widest sense (Collier
and  Hoeffler,  2000).  Estimation  of such  models  at  the  cross-country  level  suggests  that  all  three
categories are relevant but that "greed"  and the desire  to  appropriate economic  resources appears to be a
key element  underlying  the  majority  of civil  wars.  The  explanation  is  that,  of the  "grievance"-related
variables,  only ethnic dominance  tums out to be relevant. If true,  this would imply that there is  little in
terms  of outside  intervention  that can be  dorne  to  reduce  the  scope  for  civil  conflict,  in particular  that
efforts  to  promote  economic  development  tbrough  measures  such  as  better  access  to  markets  and
infrastructure  would appear rather futile.
A  major  concern  regarding  cross-country  regressions  is  that  the  number  of variables  that  can  be
considered is limited and that many of those available  are likely to suffer from endogeneity  and prone to
mis-specification  to the extent that many country-specific  variables that are of relevance  (and correlated
with other regressors) may in fact be umobservable  (e.g. Durlauf and Quah,  1999).  One example would be
country policies or historical factors.  To the extent that these variables do not vary over time, fixed effect
estimators could in principle  be used to  deal with the problem but: are  limited by two other factors.. First,
many  of the variables  hypothesized  to cause  civil  strife  (e.g.  rich endowments  with mineral resources,
6lack of infrastructure,  and ethnic diversions)  are  also time-invariant  or change only very slowly over time
and may thus not  easily be distinguished  from country  level fixed  effects.  Secondly,  even  then,  cross-
country time series  data are  still relatively rare,  especially  for (African)  countries  and for "non-standard"
factors  such  as  violence.  In  fact,  countries  with  high  incidence  of  civil  strife  are  normally  also
characterized by lack of data or by notoriously bad quality of whatever data might be available.
A second issue that is of great importance,  especially if the goal is to ascertain the impacts of civil strife,
is the potential for reverse causation.  To take one example,  low secondary enrollment is at least as likely
to be a cause as it is a consequence  of civil strife (e.g.  because schools have been destroyed,  teachers  are
absent  or have been prohibited  to  teach,  and the expected  returns  to  acquiring education  in  a war-like
envirom-nent are low). The same is true for low investment  and GDP growth,  and, to a lesser degree, even
an  economy's  dependence  on primary  exports.  While time  series  data  of sufficiently  high  frequency
would  allow  to  distinguish  between  the  two  (as  in  Asteriou  and  Siriopoulos,  2000),  these  are  rarely
available in practice.  It is of interest that, in cross-country regressions dealing with this question, deleting
one or two influential  observations  can  completely  change  the nature of the results obtained,  especially
insofar  as  Africa  is  concerned  (Arcand  et  al,  2000).  This  has  led  scholars  to  exhibit  considerable
skepticism with regard  to results from  cross-country  regressions.  Case  studies  can normally  provide  an
adequate  description of the main issues, but are often not sufficiently  detailed to allow generalization  of
the conclusions.
Both of these problems have not only limited the policy relevance of existing research but also given rise
to  the argument  that  existing  data sets  are  insufficient  to  facilitate  the  in-depth analysis that would  be
needed to support more far-reaching policy conclusions,  especially for Africa (Herbst 2000; Ali 2000). It
is therefore of interest to assess the extent to which existing results from cross-country  analysis hold up to
the more rigorous scrutiny that is possible within individual countries and there is general agreement that
data at a lower level of aggregation  would be desirable  (e.g. Dreze and Reetika 2000).  We use a similar
3 In  existing  models,  potential  non-linearities,  which  may  arise from  increasing  retums  to military  activity  (e.g.  Gaviria,  2000)  or from
7approach,  looking  first  at  the  variation  in  levels  of civil  strife  across  communities  within  the  same
country. One advantage of doing so is that,  since the policy regime is the same throughout the country by
definition,  a  large  set of possibly  influential  factors  that  are  generally  unobservable  in  cross-country
regressions,  is eliminated even if cross-sectional  estimation is used.  Second, availability of two or more
observations per community further allows us to explore  ideterninaats  of changes  in the incidence of civil
strife over  time,  thereby providing  a more  rigorous test  of the urLderlying  model.  In addition,  our  data
allow to have a more precise definition of the variables  of interest,  e.g. by distinguishing civil  strife from
other forms of physical violence and theft, and by ident,ifying more precisely the nature and magnitude  of
government  interventions,  e.g.  in  the provision  of public  goods.  Finally,  by  linlking  indicators  of civil
strife to household level  information  from the  same  communities,  we  can  measure  the  impact  of civil
strife on investment  and economic  diversification  at the household level  where  the variables  discussed
earlier are clearly exogenous.
2.2  Uganda: Historical background and relevance
Uganda, a landlocked country with a 2000 population of about 21  million, is of interest for our topic in a
number of respects.  First,  it is characterized  by ethnic,  linguistic,  and religious divisions  that are  deeply
rooted in colonial history. The country is homLe to 53 officially  recognized ethnic groups  and inhabitants
of different  regions  speak  languages  that  are  completely  incomprehensible  to  each  other.  Economic
disparities  between  the  North,  traditionally  in  control  of the  army,  and  the  South  and  West,  whose
population  generally enjoyed  greater material  wealth,  run partly  along similar  lines.  Ethnic affiliations
which continue  to be of relevance for a wide r  ange of household decisions and external conflicts  in other
African  countries  such  as in  Sudan  and more  recently  in the  Congo,  appear to have  had a significant
impact on the regional incidence of violence.
Political  violence  is  deeply  rooted  in  the  country's  history.  Following  independence  in  1962,  the
government  becarne  increasingly  authoritarian  and,  in  the  late  1960s,  politically  motivated  riots  and
asymnmetric investor behavior (Collier,  1999), are generally dealt with by including squares  of the parameters  of interest.
Smutinies  led to the death of about 2,500 people. From 1970 to 1986, under the governments  of Idi Amin
(1971-79), Milton Obote (1980-85),  and a subsequent military interlude, between 800,000  and 1,000,000
individuals (or more than 5% of the total population)  are estimated to have been killed in state terror, civil
strife,  and  ethnically  motivated  assaults  (Klugman  et  al.  1999).  When  the  government  of Yoweri
Museweni  came  to  power  in  1986,  it  managed  to  establish  a  more  integrative  political  regime,  to
repatriate  some of the Asians that had been expelled  during Amin's "Economic War", and to compensate
for the precipitous drop of GDP with growth rates which, at about 7%, were among the highest in Africa.
At the  same time, politically motivated  conflict, partly sponsored by outsiders,  continued  in parts of the
North and has, more recently,  also erupted in the West. Existing models would predict that, in view of the
long history of conflict, the risk of renewed violence remains high (Collier, 2000; Elbadawi and Sambanis
2000). Before turning to this issue and a description of the data used for our empirical  analysis, we briefly
characterize  the underlying conceptual  model.  Indeed,  it will be of interest  to  see how  civil  unrest  has
affected econornic activity at the household level during the 1990s.
2.3  Conceptual model
The key difference  between our  analysis and  those that are  available  in the literature  is that we analyze
determinants of conflict at the community level and resort to a model of household-level  decision-rnaling
to motivate the investigation of the impact of civil strife. We assume that rebels'  decision to conduct civil
strife  in a given  community  is  mainly motivated  by the revenue that  can be obtained  from explicit or
implicit taxation of the local populace.  The magnitude  of such revenue  and thus the incentive  to initiate
rebel activity,  will depend on community characteristics  determining the size of the tax revenue  that can
be  obtained.  Individuals respond  to  rebels'  imposition of taxes  by reducing  investment  or,  in extreme
cases, outmigration.  Assuming that rebels'  forces and physical assets are inmmobile  and location-specific,
whereas  labor is mobile,  yields estimable reduced form equations for the determinants and the impact of
civil strife which we will explore in more detail in the empirical part of the paper.
9Let economic  agents be endowed with  a stock of human capital E as  well as physical  assets A. They can
allocate their labor endowment  (set equal to  1 without  loss of generality)  either to productive  activities
(Ip) or to participation in rebel activities (IR)  so that IR  + Ip = 1.  Wages in the productive sector depend on
A and E according to  a function wp (A, E) with positive  first derivatives,  i.e.  'J -> 0  and  w> 0.  It is
immediate  that,  in order to have individuals  devote  time, to rebellion,  i.e. to have IR  >0, they have to be
offered a wage that is at least equal to what they could obitain in independent productive activity.
To understand  the rebels' problem, note that communities  are  characterized by a public good endowment
G and a pre-existing level of cleavage or grievance  such as ethnic fractionalization or social problems and
grievances  C. Rebel forces select communities  that provide them  with a "sufficient"  economic base, i.e.
allow  them  to  finance  themselves  by  imposing  a  tax  t  on  the  amount  of assets  available  in  the
community.4 To be  able  to enforce  this  tax,  it is necessary  to naintain  a  certain  fraction  n of people
employed by the rebel forces (fighters, informants, or other agents) in the community. We assume that n
= n(G,  C) with  "I > 0  and  In < 0. The sign of the first partial derivative arises from the fact that better
infrastructure  makes it more difficult to hide from government forces and increases asset  owners' ability
to  take preventive measures  to avoid taxation,  e.g. by deploying guards. The second partial derivative is
justified by the  fact that bigher  levels of pre-existing  grievance  will  pre-dispose  community  merribers
towards collaboration with rebels, therefore reducing the cost of initiating and sustaining violence for the
latter.5
From individual  households'  contemporaneous  utility  maximizalion,  it is immediate  that,  to attract  the
necessary labor force, rebels will have to  set the wage paid to their recruits wRI  at least equal to  wvp,  the
competitive wage in the rest of the economy.  Also,  since the wage needed for recruitment into the rebels'
forces depends  on physical  and human  capital  assets  wR (A, E), the rebels  will always  chose to recruit
4 To keep the discussion simple, we abstract from other  sources of revenue,  e.g. mining of diamonds in Congo,  which woldd allow the rebels to
cross-subsidize  their operations  in specific  locations  which  strategically  or otherwise be of importance.  It is  easily seen that,  by introducing  a
fixed term into equation  (1), this will neither affect the rebel group's marginad decision nor the substantive conclusions of the model.
5 To illustrate, one can think that with higher levels of grievance,  rebels  would be able to sustain a given level of warfare with a lower number of
combatants or collaborators.
10households with endowments at the bottom of the distribution,  i.e. with levels of assets and education  ABR
EB.6 Taking these elements together, we note that, in any community iw ith public good endowment G 1, a
level of pre-existing  conflict C,,  and average asset level A,  the rebels'  profit 7rR will be given by
(1) 7rR(A,G, C,AB,E,) = tA-n(G, C)WR(AR,EB).
where the subscript i has been suppressed for notational  clarity. In light of the above, it is not difficult to
show that these profits will increase in the average asset endowment,  t>  0, decrease with higher levels
of infrastructure  G  < 0, and with the lowest income  groups'  endowments of assets  as well as education
a"  < o0,  '<  0.  We require  that,  in each  of the  communities,  the  rebels'  activities  are  at least self- aA 8 'E-  erqir  o  m ms  av  saea
financing, i.e.  7rR >  0.
These predictions  can be tested in a reduced form framework where, for every community i, the incidence
of rebel activity  RI will depend (positively) on the mean level of assets  A,., the presence of infrastructure
GI (negative),  the level of pre-existing grievances  C, (positively),  the mean endowment with education E 1
(negative), and equality of asset distribution ABi (negative).8
(2) R,  =f(Cb Gb At, E, ABd
This equation can not only be implemented with existing data but, if confirmed empirically, has also clear
implications  for government policy that go far beyond the role that has accorded to such intervention by
traditional "greed" models. If the predicted relationships and signs were  confirmed, measures to improve
access to infrastructure and ensure  that the poor enjoy adequate education  would be important  to reduce
the risk of civil conflict, in addition to the more direct economic benefits that can be expected from them.
6Again, we abstract from the possibility of dominating a community completely  based on imported mercenaries on the grounds that at least some
local presence will be required.
7 While this can be relaxed,  thereby allowing rebels to cross-subsidize,  doing so would require a more detailed model of rebels'  internal decision-
making process, something on which very little is known  at present.
8  While some of the literature uses enrollments, this variable is likely to be highly endogenous and, especially at the country level, affected by the
presence of civil strife.Having specified  the factors  determining  rebel  activity at the comraunity  level, we  shift to households'
reaction  to  such  taxation.  As  indicated  earlier,  householLds  take  their  endowment  of human  capital  as
given and receive a full income  of Y, =  /RWR  (A, E) + Ipwp (A, E)  + [r-t(S)] Al where  S is a 0/1  dumnmy
indicating rebel presence in the community and t(O) = 0 while t(l)  t, i.e. a tax will have to be paid only
if there  is  rebel  activity.  Based  on  the income  received  at  point  t,  the  household  chooses  c, and  I,,
consumption and investment, to maximize the value function V,  (Y,  >= c, -I, + P  V,+]  (Y,+,). There are thus
two  ways  in which  rebel  activity  will  affect  the  equilibrium  level  of investment.  On  the  one  hand,
households living in areas with rebel activity obtain lower total  income  since they have  to pay taxes  on
their asset endowment.  In addition, under the assumption  of persistence  over time,  i.e. that rebel activity
will continue in the future, the return to assets received will also be lower due to the expectation of future
taxation.  Both imply  that  - < 0,  i.e.  that rebel activity  will reduce  investment.  Substituting back the
factors that have been shown to affect rebel activity earlier provides the basis for a second reduced  form
equation for household level investment.
(3) I,  =,fi(C,,  G. 7k,  EV  AB)
where Ii is the level of investment  at the household level and the remnainder of the variables are as defined
earlier. The intuition is clear - we expect that civil strife would decrease households'  incentive  to invest,
thus reducing capital accumulation,  establishment of new enterprises,  diversification of the economy,  and
overall economic growth.
2.4  Data, definitions, and descriptive  statistics
To test the hypotheses  discussed above,  we use community-  and household-level  information  from two
large  household  surveys,  the  1999/2000  Uganda  National  Household  Survey  (UNHS)  and  the  1992
Uganda  Integrated  Household  Survey  (IHS).  Both  surveys  include  household  as  well  as  community
12information on slightly less than 10,000  households in about  1000 communities  each.9 More importantly,
about 370  communities  were  visited in both periods,  allowing  us  to  have a moderately  sized panel of
communities that can be used to make inferences on changes in the variables of interest. We first focus on
the dependent  variables, civil  strife and measures of households'  investment behavior,  before turning to
the right hand side variables.
Information on whether households were affected  by civil strife, theft,  and violent attacks,  was collected
in  the  UNHS  for  1999  and  for  1992  retrospectively.  In  line  with the  literature  which  uses  different
definitions  to  distinguish civil  strife from violence  directed at specific persons (Singer  and Small  1994),
enumerators  were  instructed  to differentiate  between  civil strife  and other  forms of violence using two
characteristics.  On  the  one hand,  civil  strife  is primarily  addressed  at  groups  rather  than individuals.
Furthermore,  the  main  motive  for  civil  strife  is  normally  not  individual  economic  gain  even  though
economic  factors  at  the  group  level may  play  a role.'°  The information  thus  collected  was  used  to
construct two variables  measuring the incidence  of civil  strife, theft,  and physical attacks.  The first is a
simple 0/1  dummy indicating whether a  community is affected by civil  strife, theft,  or attacks implying
that the incidents in question is reported by at least one household in the sample without making reference
to how  widespread it  was.  The  second measure  uses  the share  of households  in any  community  who
reported to have been affected by civil strife, attacks,  or theft."
To measure households'  investment behavior we  rely on two indicators.  The first one  is the increase in
enterprise  assets, defined to include agricultural  assets, structures,  and transport equipment but excluding
household durables and other consumer goods. This is based on questions  on current endowments and the
' For purposes  here we take enumeration  areas  as  a "community".  This  is  certainly justified  in the  large majority of cases (especially in  rural
areas)  where enumeration areas correspond to natural  villages.
" The phrasing of the three questions  was as  follows: (i) "Has your production of crops/cattle or livestock rearing/trading activities  been harmed
by civil strife  over the last  12 monthsT';  (ii) "How many incidents  of theft of property  has the household suffered  in the last  12 months?"; and
"How many incidents of physical  attacks  on members of the household have there been over the last  12 months?'. In the interviewer training, it
was highlighted that civil strife refers to violence that is not directed at any specific person but rather at a group.  All of the questions were asked
retrospectively  for 1992 as well. Based on this information  we classify a community as affected by civil strife, theft, or attacks, if it is reported by
at least one household.
" Unfortunately,  the survey does  not contain information  on the magnitude  of the damage  inflicted  on individual  households,  something that
would have allowed to measure the severity of violence in a given location.
13amount  owned  in 1992  of 20  categories  of such  assets  included  in the  survey.'2 A second variable  of
interest,  especially in an agrarian  economy  such as  Uganda,  is whether the household expanded  andlor
initiated non-farm economic activities during the period imder conceem.  This variable,  which was defined
as  the  household  having  spent  time  and  received  income  from  an  own  non-farm  and  non-livestock
enterprise,  allows to test the extent to which  cwvil  strife  affects processes of economic  diversification.  It
corresponds  directly  to  the  hypothesis  advanced  by Collier  (1999)  that  civil  strife  leads  to  a shift of
economic  activity towards subsistence and autarky which are relatively less sensitive  or vulnerable to the
disruptions  caused by such strife.  To the extent that, in  agrarian  African economies,  growth  in off-farm
investment is generally viewed as a critical pre-condition for broader growth (Reardon et al. 2001), such a
shift  of the.asset  and  activity  portfolio  towards  subsistence  could  be  associated  with  a  signilicant
reduction in the growth potential.
Definitions of other right-hand side variables  are reported below. lTo proxy for the level and inequality of
education (E) and asset ownership  (A),  we use the mean level of schooling for household members above
15  years of age as well as their initial asset endowments,  as discussed above.  The distribution of assets is
measured  as  the  log  deviation  of asset  ownership  within each  of the  communities  under  concern.  In
addition, whether or not coffee  or cotton are grown in a particular  area is taken as a proxy for taxable or
expropriable  wealth in the short to  medium term.' 3 Although cash crops  may not be  suitable  to sustain
rebels during prolonged periods of civil conflict, they are relatively immobile and can be established only
in regions with  certain agro-climatic  characteristics,  thuls  being less  subject  to problems of endogeneity
than other variables that might be used to proxy for pre-existing wealth.
'2 As  it was impossible  to  obtain precise  retrospective  infonmation  on the value  of each  of the assets,  respondents  were  asked to provide  a
qualitative rank  for the value  of the asset in  question in  1992.  Based  on experience  in the field, the 5 rankings (about  equal,  somewhat more,
somewhat less, none, and much more) were transformed into percentage increases (0, +  25'14, -25%, -100%, + 50%) to be able to obtain the value
of assets in 1992.
13  As rightly pointed out by an anonymous  reviewer,  coffee is qiuite different from taxable mineral wealth  (e.g. diamonds) on which insurgencies
can easily thrive insofar as it is  a relatively bulky and will easily degenerate into bush if not properly  tended. To the extent that what is observed
during the period  under concern  is not a fill-scale guerilla  war but rather  incidents of viclence  and other forms of conflict,  using this variable,
together  with  asset  endowments,  as a  measure for  resource  availability,  is  still  defensible.  Note that  cotton,  which  requires  higher  levels  of
purchased inputs, is even less able to provide even temporary  sustenance to the participants  in civil conflict and would therefore be expected  to be
of much lower significance  than coffee.
14Availability  of infrastructure  (G)  is  measured  differently  in the  static  and the  dynamic  model.  In  the
former,  we use the distance  to the  next municipality,  expressed in hours of travel time using the most
common means of transport.  This variable  also proxies physio-geographic  conditions such as ruggedness
of the  terrain  or forest  cover  which, as  pointed out in the  literature,  can make  it easier for rebels  to
operate.  To  measure  changes  over time  in the  availability  of infrastructure,  we include  information  on
whether  or not a road was  constructed  during  the  last 4  years  within  50  km of the  community,  an
intervention that is clearly exogenous to the individual household.
Proxies for pre-existing grievances  (C) are also constructed in two number of ways.  First, in line with the
literature, we use an index of ethnic fractionalization from the percentage  share of population belonging
to the  four most irmportant  ethnic  groups.'4 A second  measure  is the  perception  (as derived  from the
community  survey)  on the most pressing problem preventing development  in the community.  While the
large  majority  of communities  pointed  towards  specific  issues  (e.g.  market  access,  schooling,  health,
agricultural technology),  about one fourth of communities  mentioned pervasive  poverty as the key issue,
pointing towards  a generalized  feeling of destitution and lack of perspective  in the community which  is
likely to make it easier for rebels to obtain recruits.
Descriptive  statistics  on  the  incidence  of civil  strife,  theft,  and attacks,  at  the  community  level,  are
presented  in table  1. Surprisingly,  the  share of households  who  were affected by  civil strife  increased
during  the  1992-99  period,  from  5.9%  to  9.7%.  This  is  in  line  with  an  increase  in  the  share  of
communities  from which  such  activity is reported  from 38%  in  1992  to 69%  in  1999/2000.  Regional
disaggregation  illustrates that  the increase  was particularly  pronounced in the West where  the  share  of
households  suffering from civil strife more than doubled,  from 5.5% to 12.4%, reaching  almost the level
of the  North  (13%) which  shows  a more modest  increase  from 9.6%  since  1992.  While the Center is
consistently  characterized  by the  lowest incidence  of civil  strife  (4.3%  and 2.5%)  in both perods,  it  is
4 Data  on etimicity are  available only at the community level,  preventing us from performing further and more disaggregated  analysis (e.g.  by
differentiating  between  households who  had been  bom in the locality and those who  migrated in  ubsequently).  The infonnation  given  is the
share of the population that belongs to the four most important ethnic groups i, Es. Sunming Ei 2 for all  i,  subtracting it from 1, and normalizing
the result so that all values fall between  0 and  I gives the measure used in the analysis.
15remarkable  that even there the incidence of conflict has increased.  Similar increases  are also reported for
the incidence of thefts (from 8.5%  to 14.7%) and violent attacks  (from 2.6% to 4.2%). Even though both
are highest in the North, theft is also quite high in the Central region anel personal attacks in the East. This
provides some support for the notion that these variables measure in facl different phenomena.
Other variables  of interest  are the total  value  of assets,  measured in constant  1999  US $ equivalents  as
well  as  the  share  of communities  where  coffee  or cotton  are  grown.  The  mean value  of assets  at the
community level increased by about 40% in real te-nns during the period.  It is lowest in the North where,
in  1992,  it was less than one third of the national  average, followed by the East, the Center and the West.
At the  same  time,  the estimated  increase  in mean.  asset levels  for the North  was quite high,  from the
equivalent  of US  $ 550 to US  $  1144.  Most  likely as  a res,ponse to increasing  coffee prices during the
period, the share of communities where coffee  is grown has more than doubled between the two periods,
from about  14% to about 33%. While coffee production remains negligible in the North, about one fourth
of cormnunities in the West and the East and almost two thirds in the Center reported, in 1999, cultivation
of this  commodity,  up from  15%,  10%,  and  26%/o,  respectively.  By contrast,  the  share  of communities
growing cotton has  remained virtually  stagnant,  with  a  slight  decline  in the  West offset  by a modest
increase (from 8% to 12%) in the Northern part of the country.
3.  Estimation strategy
This section  describes the estimation strategy for determinants  of levels as well  as, using changes in the
variables of interest, increases  in the level of civil  strife at the community level.  In addition,  we discuss
the methodology for measuring the  impact of civil strife  on household  level  investment  and enterprise
start-up decisions.
3.1  Determinants of civil strife
The earlier discussion leads us to model the probability of civil strife in any community as a function of
the parameters  A ,  G, C, As,  EB, i.e. mean level of assets, infrastructure,  grievances, and the distribution of
16human as  well  as  physical capital  in a  community.  To  do  so  empirically,  we define  a vector of mean
household  level  characteristics  Xi  as  well  as  community  level  variables  Zi  that  correspond  to  the
parameters  discussed above. Adding  an error  term allows to estimate a cross-sectional  equation  for the
incidence of civil strife as follows.
(4)  Si = a +fX;  +  Z 1 +  e6
Pooling  the  observations  from  1992  and  1999/2000  allows  us  to  test  for  structural  changes  in  the
contribution of some of the right hand side variables by interacting  them with a year dummy. In a similar
manner, we explore whether, after controlling for other factors, there has been a net increase in civil strife
either in the aggregate or for specific regions of  the country.
Although estimation of this relationship  within  a given country will avoid many of the issues associated
with unobservable  policy factors in cross-country regressions,  cross sectional estimates  are still likely to
omit unobservable  factors (e.g.  households'  party affiliations  or historical incidents)  which might affect
the level of civil strife. To deal with this and at the same time use the availability of two observations per
community in part of our data we complement  this with an estimation of detenninants  of changes in the
incidence of civil strife according to
(5)  AS,  =  1'  (Xit  -X,,d  + 6  Zit - Za-l) +YSi-l+ E
where AS, is the change in the incidence of civil strife in community ib etween the two periods,  SE,  is the
level of such conflict in the same community during the initial period, and the expressions in brackets are
changes in the independent variables.  Under the condition that one can find variables the change of which
is exogenous  to  the community,  this can be estimated using standard  techniques.'5 Specifically,  we  will
estimate  a probit  equation  with  an indicator  for  increases  in the  level of civil strife  as  the dependent
variable and changes of the variables discussed earlier on the right hand side.
s Note that changes in education will be endogenous  because households  decide whether or not children stay in school. Also, with high levels of
decentralization,  even supply of schooling  infrastructure can no  longer be considered  completely  exogenous,  conhtary to, for example,  roads..
Similarly, changes in movable asset endowments  are likely to be endogenous and can  thus not be used as a right-hand side variable.
173.2  The economic  Impact of civil  strife
The  prediction  that  civil  strife  would,  by  imposing  a  taoc  t on  all  assets  in the  commnunity,  reduce
incentives  for investmnent and enterprise  startups, is testable with available  data.  To do so, let Aj, be the
asset stock held by householdj (in community i) in period t. Then households'  investment, Aj4,  - Aji,s,,  cam
be regressed against a set of exogenous variables and initial conditions similar to equation (3)  above.
(6) A1u -Ap,, =fiIjy,., + VZI + 6 Sj, ,  §,,
where Al, - Ai,-,  is the net investment  between  1  992 and  1999  and X is a set of initial household  level
conditions  including  the level  of education  and  age of the householct  head, Z is a set of time invariant
community-level  characteristics,  especially urban and regional dummies, and Su.,  is  a variable  indicating
the presence and intensity of civil strife at the community level. Use of the community-level  variable on
civil strife is appropriate because, even in if they are not directly affected, presence  of civil conflict in a
given community  will affect households'  behavior and lead them to  adopt precautionary  strategies.  The
fact that,  for any given  household,  the  amount  of civil  strife  is exogenous  allows  us to  overcome  the
endogeneity problem that affect attempts to recover the ingact of civil unrest from more aggregate  data.
While the range  of right hand  variables  is constrained  to those that could be obtained  retrospectively  in
the  1999/2000  survey,  the ability to include  almost  10,0)0  households  more than cornpensates  for this
shortcoming.
If civil war has led to significant changes in the compositioni of economic activity, one might be interested
not only in the total amount of investment but also the  sector in which  such investment was undertaken.
To  do  so,  we  use  a  probit  regression  with  an  indicator  of non-agricultural  enterprise  startups  as  the
dependent variable
(7)  ESj,, =lXj,,,  + yZ' + 6St,+ qgj,
where ES, is a dummy variable that takes  the value of one if,  during the  1992-2000  period, household  i
started  a  new  non-agricultural  enterprise  and  zero  otherwise.  The  remainder  of the  right hand  side
18variables  are  as  explained  earlier.  Although  we  can use  only  about  1200  panel  households,  these  are
located in almost 400 different communities,  implying not only wide variation in the variables of interest
but also a number of observations  that is much larger than what is generally available  in cross-country
type regressions.  This would, in particular,  allow us to deal better with the problem of endogeneity  and
improve on the rather  indirect  evidence  that  is available  in the  literature  (e.g.  Collier  1999)  by giving
some quantification and comparing the impact of  civil strife to that of other variables of interest.
4.  Results
Concerning  the  causes of civil  strife,  our  results  support  the  general  significance  of the  economic
variables  considered  in  Collier and Hoeffier  (2000)  even  though  additional factors,  such  as  access  to
education  and infrastructure,  emerge as quite important. At the same time, we note that variables of high
statistical significance are not necessarily the ones that are quantitatively the most important. In particular
if looking  at changes,  this implies  greater  importance  of policy-related variables  such  as infrastructure
provision.  In  addition  to  providing  insights  into  factors  underlying  civil  strife,  the  regressions  also
demonstrate that higher levels of this phenomenon also reduce aggregate investment  and drive individuals
into  greater  reliance  on  subsistence  and  less  integration  into  markets,  implying  that  in  communities
affected by high levels of civil strife, both investment and diversification will remain stunted.
4.1  Determinants of civil strife
Results on determinants  of civil strife are reported in table 2. To avoid spurious  conclusions, we use both
a zero/one indicator for the presence of civil conflict at the community level in a probit regression as well
as the share of community members reporting to have been affected as a measure  of the severity of such
conflict for a tobit specification.  As noted  earlier,  information  on the level of civil  conflict  in  1992 was
obtained retrospectively  in the  1999/2000  survey. This implies that the independent variables  needed for
the  1992  regression  are  available  only  for  the  371  "panel"  communities  that  were  included  in  both
19surveys.  We therefore  report results for two  samples,  the pooled sampyle  that contains 980 observations
from  1999/2000  plus  371  observations  from  1992  (columns  1 and  2)  as  well  as  the  "panel"  with
information on 371 communities in both periods (columns 3 aLnd 4). As indicated in the bottom row, about
44% of communities had at least one household affected by civil strife (column 1) while on average only
about 8% of the population was affected by this pbenomerion  (columnns  2-4). In addition, we use the fact
that we have a panel to estimate a random effect tobit model (column 4). Furthermore,  column 5 gives the
rneans of the independent  variables  used in the regression.  As the regressions  do not indicate significant
changes  over time in the coefficients  for individual right hand  side  'ariables,  we report  the regression
where only regional dummies are interacted with the year dummy.
The results can provide insights as to more genera]  patterns  and are generally in line with the predictions
from  our model,  even  though more  in-depth  case  study may  be needed  to  adapt  these to the  specific
conditions  of Uganda.  Higher  human capital  endowments  by households  are  estimated  to  significantly
reduce the  likelihood of civil  strife. The  quadratic  specification  suggests that higher levels  of education
decrease individuals'  propensity to engage  in civil  strife at a declining rate up to an absolute minimum is
between  8.1  and 5.9  years  of schooling per  household,  dLepending  on  the  specification.  With  a  mean
attainment  of less than  5 years,  there appears  scope  for reducing  the potential  for violence  by  further
increasing  aggregate levels of human capital.  At the same  tfime,  the irapact is estimated to be greatest in
communities  where  current endowments  with human capital  are very  low.  For example,  increasing  the
level  of education  by  a  community  in  the  second  decile  from  2.5  years  to  the  mean  of 4.9  would,
according to the probit regression, reduce the risk of civil conflict by than  10.5% while a similar addition
of 2.4 years for a community at the mean would reduce the risk of conilict only by 4.8%.16
In addition to human capitaL, endowments  with physical  capital are also estimated to be important in the
tobit regression  with panel  communities  (though  not in the pooled tcbit).  The presence  of coffee  at the
community  level,  as  a immobile  asset  the  returns  of which  can  be expropriated  in the  short,  is very
20significant.  Furthermore,  and in line  with the prediction that presence of infrastructure  and other public
goods  decreases  the  cost  of  policing  and  thus  the  probability  of  civil  strife,  higher  distance  to
infrastructure  has indeed a marked positive impact on the probability of civil strife while location in urban
areas reduces this probability, at least according to some of the specifications.
As is suggested by the  descriptive  statistics in table  1, there are pronounced  differences  across regions.
While the  Center has  the lowest  level of civil  strife,  the East and North have  continuing  high levels  of
violence and there has been a marked increase in civil conflict in the West,  something that is likely to be
related to broader regional patterns  and a spillover from conflicts in Rwanda and military engagement  in
the Republic of Congo. While civil strife in the West was significantly lower than in the East or the North
in  1992,  it  is now  on a level  equal to these regions  and only the Central  region continues to  display  a
markedly  lower level of civil strife than the remainder of the country.'7
Table  1 in the appendix reports results from conducting exactly the same tobit regressions with incidence
of theft and physical attacks as the dependent variables.  Comparing these to what was obtained  for civil
strife suggests that these are indeed very different phenomena. Only very few of the coefficients  discussed
earlier turn out to be significant.  For the ones that do, signs obtained are generally opposite from what has
been observed for the case of civil strife.  For example,  the incidence of theft is higher close to the center
of the municipality,  i.e. increases  directly with the availability of infrastructure  in addition to being much
more prevalent in the North, and its it is also estimated to have increased significantly over time. Physical
attacks are  estimated to increase  with levels  of education  and wealth inequality,  contrary  to what  was
observed for civil strife,  and to be more prevalent in the North and the West, as well as in coffee growing
areas.  This supports  the notion that politically motivated violence  and civil  strife respond to factors that
are different from those that underlie theft and violence aimed at individuals.
16  The result on human capital is very similar to what is found by Dreze and Khera  who, using district level data on murder rates in India,  find a
significant negative correlation between education  and murder.
17  Testing  for equality of the coefficients on the different dummies  rejects equality of the Westem with the Eastern and Northern dummies  (F =
6.59  and  11.51  both  suggesting  significance  at the  1% level)  but  can  not  reject such  equality  for the  same dummies plus  the  dummy*year
interaction  (F =  1.11 and 0.81).  Similarly, equality between North  and East can not be rejected  at the 5%  level  for either period (F = 1.59  and
3.11). Note that the test statistic for all of these tests is distributed F(1,727).
214.2  What causes increases in the incidence  of civil  strife?
As variously noted in the literature,  static analysis of' civil strife in a cross section can provide interesting
insights but may fail to point towards possible causal links that could provide the basis for specific policy
interventions.  The fact that, for a subset of communities,  infciimation  is available  on two periods,  allows
us to  go beyond the  cross-sectional  determinants  to identify  factors  that have  contributed to increased
levels  of civil  strife  and  which  could,  by  implication,  be  used  as  policy  instruments  to  reduce  the
incidence of this phenomenon.I8
To do so, we estimate equation (5) using as a dependent variable a zero/one indicator that assumes a value
of one for all  communities where the share of respondents who indicated  that they have been affected by
civil  strife  is  higher  in  1999/2000  than  it  was  in  1992.  This  was  the  case  for  31%  of  the  panel
communities.  Independent  variables  include  the  lagged  value  of  civil  strife  to  capture  the  impact  of
historical  conditions,  as  well  as  proxies  for  changes  in  levels  of  infrastructure  (G),  assets  (A),  and
grievances (C), respectively. The first is proxied by a dummy equaling one for communities who reported
that after  1997,  a  road was  built within  50 km from the  comnmunity,  thereby  improving  infrastructure
access for inhabitants;  as illustrated in table 3 this had been the case in 7.5%  of communities. Changes  in
the endowment  with  immovable  assets  are proxied by the  change  in the  share  of producers  growing
coffee.  Finally,  to  account  for households'  perceptions  on  the  scope  for  economic  development,  we
include a dummy indicating that the comrnunity perceived poverty rather than more specific issues as the
most  pressing  problem,  something that  is  taken  as  an indicator  for a  general  lack  of perspective  and
economic  opportunities.  Descriptive statistics  in column  4 of table 3 illustrate that 24% of communities
viewed poverty as the main issue.
18  We  assume that the reverse (i.e. reducing)  will also hold, but note that our sample does not contain a sufficiently large number of communities
where civil strife decreased in order to make more precise  inferences on this subject  which remains  nm  important area for future rsearch.
22Results  from  probit regressions  for  371  panel  communities  offer  interesting  insights,  in  addition  to
confirming the  significant  increase  of civil strife in the West."9 Table  3 illustrates  the results for three
specifications,  in addition to providing means for the independent variables  and we directly focus on the
full  model  (column  3)  in interpreting  results.  First,  we  note  a tendency  towards  persistence  or even
escalation;  in fact the higher the share  of the population who  were affected by civil  strife  in  1992,  the
more likely is it for this phenomenon to have  spread further in the intervening period. To get an idea of
the magnitude  of the associated effect, note that a 20 percentage  point increase of the population affected
by civil  strife, which  corresponds  to the move  from the  75il  to the  95th  percentile  of the  distribution,
would  be equivalent  to  an increase  in  the probability  of observing  increased  levels  of civil  strife  by
13.6%.  Second, the regression confirms that exogenous  changes in infrastructure access do indeed have a
powerful impact on breaking the tendency towards higher levels of civil strife; according to the estimates
building of a road within 50 km from the community would reduce the probability of observing increased
levels of civil  strife by about  18%. Third, the high significance  of the coefficient  on the increase  in the
number of coffee  growers  suggests that this  variable,  either through  an  increase  in taxable  income,  or
through a spread in the wealth distribution,  indeed increases  the propensity towards civil  conflict. At the
same time, the magnitude of the predicted effect is srnall; even increasing the share of coffee growers  by
50% would increase the risk of increased violence by less than one percentage  point. Finally, we note that
perceptions are of major importance;  the community not being  able to pinpoint specific interventions  or
problems  that impede development  is estimated to increase  the propensity  towards escalation  of conflict
by almost 22%.
Taken together these results suggest a lower  importance of "greed",  and a much increased relevance  of
issues  related  to  poverty  and availability  of public  goods  than  would  be  suggested by  existing  cross-
country  regressions.  From  a  methodological  perspective,  this  suggests  that  extrapolation  from results
obtained  at the country level  to sub-national  aggregates  may not be  warranted  without checking  of the
'9 Note  that the coefficients  given  are  the  marginal  effects  at the mean  of all  other  variables,  allowing  to  make  inferences  in terns  of the
probability of civil strife in a given community.
23underlying  assumptions.  From  a substantive  point  of viiewv,  it swould  imply that policy  factors  are  more
important than traditionally assLumed.
4.3  Impact of civil  strife on asset accumulation
One  of the advantages  of using evidence  on civil  strife  in  the  context of a  household  survey is  that,  in
addition to  exploring determinants  of politically  motivated conflict at the  cormmunity  level, the data als,o
allow to  examine the  impact  of civil  stnfe  on  economnic  outcomes,  at  both  at the  commanity  and the
individual  level.  As  the  incidence  of civ/il  strife  at  the  community  level  is  not  a  choice  variable  for
individual  households,  and since  migration  as  is a response  that  is  riot  only associated  with very high
costs  but  also  not  open to  all  households  in  a  conmrmunity,  doing  so  is  less  affected  by  problems  [f
endogeneity  than use of aggregate or cross-countr)  data.
Table  4 reports  the  results of a probit  equation  Using  a  0,1  durmmy  indicating  that a  given  househcld
increased its asset stock (something that was the case for 81  ]o  of households,  as indicated in the bottom of
the table),  as well as a tobit equation for the net increase  in  household,'  assets  at constant prices, between
the two periods  1992 and  1999.2°  In line  with our hypothesis,  presence  of civil  strife at the  comnmunty
level is estimated to have had a highly  significant  impact or  mNvestment,  both for the probit and the to Dit
equation.  The probit equation suggests  that an increase  of  1.0%  in the proportion of households  affected
by civil  strife  is  equivalent to  about one year  of schooling.  Moreover,  neither  theft nor  violent  attacks
(constructed  as explained above)  have  any impact  o0i  household  levcl  investment  (columni  3 of table  4),
again reinforcing the differenace  betweern  these phenomena.
In  addition  to highlighting  the  investment-reducing  impact  ol  civil  conflict,  the  regressLons  provide  a
number  of  other  insights.  First,  the  negative  coefficient  on  the  head's  age  supports  the  life-cycle
dimension  of investrnent. Younger households  are estimated to be both more likely to invest and to make
larger  investments,  in  line  with  accumLilation  of  assets  over  the  life-cycle,  with  investment  reaching  a
2  The independent  variable for civil  stnfe (as  well  as theft and physical attack)  is the  share of households within  any given  :ommuuotty repoiting
to have been affected by civil strife.
24peak  at about  49  years.  We  also  find evidence  for  a  catch-up phenomenon  whereby  households  with
lower initial  asset levels  are characterized by a higher propensity to invest than those who already owned
significant  amounts of assets  at the  begirnning  of the period,  similar to the convergence  in growth rates
and asset levels that is found in contributions  to the growth literature  (e.g.  Barro 1991).  We also note that
more educated households have higher rates of investment even once the initial asset endowment is taken
into account  The marginal  imnpact  of education reaches its maximum at about  13  years of schooling and
decreases  thereafter.  Availability  of additional  labor  at  the  household  level  is  estimated  to  increase
investment,  suggesting  not only that more  family labor constitutes  an important  addition to households'
endowments but also that fornal labor markets in Uganda may be characterized by significant rationing.
Even  once  other  factors  are  controlled for,  investment  is  estimated to be systematically  lower in urban
areas  than  in  the rural  sector.  This  suggests  that any  possible  bias  against  rural  areas  that might have
reduced  investment  incentives  in  the  past  is  likely  to  have  been  eliminated  by  the  policy  reforms
undeitaken  since the early  1990s.  The coefficient in the probit equation  suggests that a household living
in rural areas  would be 5%  more likely to have  invested during the period under concem  than an urban
dweller.
Not surprisingly,  in view of differences  in the type of assets  available and the returns that can be obtained
from  these  assets,  as  well  as  variation  in cultural  attitudes  towards  saving and  asset  accumulation,  the
propensity  to  irvest  varies  considerably  across  regions.  A  household  in  the  North,  for  example,  is
estimated to be  12 percentage points less likely to invest than one in the center. The propensity to invest is
4% higher in the West than in the Center.
4.4  Impact of civil strife on startup of non-farm enterprises
In a predominantly  ruwal  economy  such as Uganda  where  opportunities  for wage employment  are quite
limited,  start-up of non-farm enterprises  in the informal  sector is of great importance for broad  economnicgrowth in rural areas.21 Table 5 illustrates that almost  400/D  of the households in the  sample have,  durinlg
the period under concern, either started up a new non-farm  enterprise or expanded on an existing one. At
the same time, mortality of these enterprises was bigh as  Mwell;  almost  19% of households closed down an
existing enterprise.  The underlying hypothesis is Ihat individuals who have been affected by civil strife in
the past will reduce their exposure to the non-fann  econornmy.  Results from estimating a probit regression
for equation  (7) where the  dependent variable  is  a dummy  for  expansion  or disappearance  of non-farm
enterprises are reported in table 5 where the coefficients  reported are inarginal probabilities  at the mean of
other variables.  We  first discuss  the  results  for  non-farm  enterprise  startups,  comparing  them to  the
investment  equation,  and finally  shift  to  a brief consideration  of the  factors  underlying  shrinkage  and
disappearance of enterprises.
In general,  results are  consistent  with expectations  as to the  variables not referring to civil  conflict.  As
noted in the  investment  equation,  higher levels of education,  higher endowments  with assets, and lower
age  all  increase  the  propensity  to  start  non-farm  enterprises.  Sinmilarly,  the  propensity  to  do  so  is
significantly  higher,  by more  than 20  percentage points,  in urban than in rural areas,  possibly reflecting
the scope for accessing  informal finance and to lhnk into trading networks.  Having been affected by civil
strife  reduces  the propensity  to establish  such  an  enterprise  by almost  10%.  Comparing  the  estimated
coefficient  to those of other variables helps to illustrate  the importar ce of this effect;  to compensate one
would have to increase  the head's level of education by at least 4 years  or to increase the initial value of
asset endowments  by more  than double the mean observed  in the  sample.  Again,  the estimates  suggest
that it is only civil strife but not theft or physical violence  vhere such an impact is observed. Also, it is of
interest to note that, finding an impact of violence on asset accumulation  mainly at the community level
and on non-agricultural enterprise startups  at the individual  level is consistent with the hypothesis of civil
21 In fact, the household survey  data allow us to confirm that,  as emphasized  in a number of rcent contributions to the literature (Reardon  et al,
2001),  non-farm  enterprises  make an  increasing  contribution  to  the livelihood  of the rural poor.  Non-farm enterprises  are  quantitatively  more
important than wage income of the rural poor and,  in contrast to overall  stagnation of rnual wE.ge earnings  during the 1992  to  1999 period, Shave
shown a considerable increase, from about 9% of household income to more than  15%  (Deininger and Okidi, 2001).
26conflict shifting individuals towards  subsistence,  even though it may not significantly  affect their overall
rate of asset accumulation as compared to others in the village.
The literature  notes that the flip-side  of high levels  of enterprise  startups  is  in many  cases a significant
amount of enterprise mortality. For this reason, it is useful to complement our analysis of startups with an
assessment  of the factors  associated with shrinkage and/or closure  of non-farm enterprises  even though
the numbers involved are slightly smaller. Doing so reveals that, albeit to a smaller extent than in the case
of startups,  civil  strife  increases  the  probability  of firms  going  out  of  business.  The  corresponding
regressions are illustrated in the second half of table 4. In addition to illustrating the impact of civil strife,
the  figures  reported  there  allow  a  number  of  conclusions.  First,  while  education  seems  to  have  a
negligible impact, age of the household head, a variable  that is closely related to experience,  emerges  as
very important. Higher  levels of assets  also  reduce the risk of enterprise  failure, not too surprising in an
environment where credit markets are likely to be highly imperfect and where it is therefore the ability to
draw down own assets that enables households  to self-ensure.  While urban communities  are characterized
by  significantly  higher levels of enterprise  startups, urban areas  show a marginally  (though  significant)
lower  rate  of failures.22  The  opposite  is  true  for  areas  that  are  more  distant  to  the  municipality.
Presumably  as a result of the higher potential profits but also risks associated  with doing business more
distant from urban centers,  these areas  are also characterized by both higher levels of startups and higher
levels of failure.
5.  Conclusion and policy implications
This is one of the first discussions of civil strife and violence for Africa that relies on micro-level data and
thus  can  be  directly  linked  to  economic  models  of household  behavior.  Use  of  household  level
information, rather than aggregate data,  allows us to demonstrate empirically  the difference between civil
strife and "ordinary"  theft or physical violence and to show that these two phenomena arise for different
27reasons and have vastly different consequences.  We also  prosvide emp rical support for the hypothesis that
civil strife has  a significant and quantitatively  rnporlant irnpact  on investment decisions  at the household.
level and for the broader diversification  of the economy.  The  fact that it  is cross-community  and inter-
regional  differences  in the  incidence  of  civil  confiict  ift  at  af'fect  economic  outcomes  highlights  that,
beyond the much-emphasized  effect on international  investors'  conficlence,  civil violence may be equaLly
important for the investment  and business choices  rmade by  the clomeslic population.
Our results on the  determinants of civil strife suggesl  thai,  the presence  of sufficient resourc;es  or "greec"--
related factors is an important  determinant of the  em,ergence of civil conflict, thus confirming  hypotheses
from  the  cross-country  literature.  At  the  same  time,  we  also  find  that  there  are  other  factors  more
amenable to government policy that provide a basis for policy  interventions aiming to reduce the potential
for civil  strife.  Finding  that the probability  of civil  strife  increases  with  lower  levels  of education  and
infrastructure  access  as  well  as  asset  endowments  suggests  that  interventions  to  improve  economic
opportunities  could have an important irnpact on reducing the potential for civil conflict. This is supported
by the finding that provision of infrastructure,  as  well as households'  perceptions,  can greatly reduce the
propensity  for  increased  civil  strife.  While  this  suggests  that  "destiny",  in  the  form  of pre-existing
endowments and factors  such as location,  ethnic differences,  and landlocked  status, may be less important
thban has often been suggested by the literature,  it also implies  that policy, especially activities that aim to
increase  poor people's  access to assets  in the widlest  sense, may be inore effective  as  a means  to reduce
the scope for civil conflict and violence  than has been thought traditionally.  Further research  on this issue
would certainly be warranted.
O  of course, one would want to distinguish more clearly  he time  of enterprise  estzablishment  to inake a definite conclusion  on this.References:
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30Table 1: Regional  incidence  of civil strife in Uganda,  1992 and 1999
1992
All Uganda  Central  Eastem  Northem  Westem
Households affected by civil strife  5.9%  2.5%  8.4%  9.6%  5.5%
...  theft  8.5%  6.9%  9.1%  13.6%  7.1%
...  personal attacks  2.6%  1.5%  2.6%  4.0%  2.9%
Communities affected by civil strife  35.8%  20.5%  45.3%  47.6%  38.2%
Total value of assets  1828.08  2138.67  1369.41  552.03  2628.21
Share of communities  growing coffee  13.7%  26.3%  10.9%  0.9%  14.1%
Shareofcommunitiesgrowingcotton  5.3%  0.2%  11.1%  8.1%  2.1%
1999
All Uganda  Central  Eastem  Northeem  Westem
Households  affected by civil strife  9.7%  4.3%  10.7%  13.0%  12.4%
...  theft  14.7%  13.5%  17.1%  17.5%  11.8%
...  personal attacks  4.2%  2.8%  5.3%  6.3%  3.2%
Communities affected by civil  strife  51.2%  32.3%  53.8%  54.1%  69.7%
Total value of assets (US $)  2490.55  3181.98  1827.47  1144.91  3261.03
Share of communities  growing coffee  32.6%  62.5%  26.8%  1.6%  27.3%
Share of communities growing cotton  5.4%  0.6%  11.0%  12.3%  0.3%
Source: Own computation from the 1992 and 1999 Uganda National Household Surveys
31Table 2: Determinants of civil  strife, Uganda  1992  and 1999  _  -
All communities  Panel communities only  Means of
Probit  l'obit  Tobit  RE tobit  indep. var.
Mean education (>  15  a)  -0.081***  -0.044***  -0().047***  -0.031***  4.93
(3.39)  (4.29)  (3.52)  (2.77)
Education squared  0.005***  0.003***  0.004**"  0.002**  30.07
(2.66)  (3.42)  (3.20)  (2.21)
Totalassetvalue(log)  0.039*  0.015  0.028*4  0.026  14.35
(1.79)  (1.53)  (2.27)  (1.60)
Coffee growing area  0.204***  0.125***  0.123**o  0.108***  25.07%
(3.85)  (5.26)  (3.59)  (3.42)
Cotton growing area  -0.035  0.032  0.058  0.077  5.26%
(0.34)  ((0.69)  (0.91)  (1.52)
Urban area  -0.110l*  -0.074**  -0.063*  -0.011  14.08%
(1.85)  (2.57)  (1.73)  (0.37)
Distance to municipality  0.136***  0.057***  0.061 **  0.054**  0.59
(3.33)  (3.09)  (3.26)  (2.45)
Wealth inequality  1.650  0.424  0.197  0.062  0.55%
(1.26)  (1.27)  (0.53)  (0.23)
Ethnic fractionalization index  0.093**  0.043**  0.045  0.022  48.83%
(1.99)  (1.99)  (156)  (0.89)
Eastem  region  0.400***  0.218***  0.221**  0.215***  25.95%
(5.38)  (5.77)  (5.66)  (5.53)
Northernregion  0.431***  0.260***  0.273**  0.267***  15.18%
(5.08)  (5.84)  (5.75)  (5.90)
Westemnregion  0.236***  0.124***  0.126***  0.132***  26.81%
(3.09)  (3;.27)  (3.24)  (3.44)
Eastern Region*Year  -0.083  -0.029  -0.045  -0.053*  13.0%
(0.96)  ((0.68)  (0.91)  (1.88)
Northem Region*Year  0.105  0.036  -0.025  -0.035  7.6%
(1.04)  ((0.77)  (0.44)  (1.05)
Western Region*Year  0.228***  0.107**  0.086*  0.063**  13.4%
(2.65)  (2.53)  (1.77)  (2.25)
Year of survey  0.061  0.034  0.063*  0.078***  50.0%
(0.95)  (1.07)  (1.68)  (3.23)
Constant  -0.362***  -0.566***  -0.559**
(2.59)  (3.10)  (2.40)
Observations  1351  1351  742  742
Censored observations  711  412  412
Pseudo=R
2 .108  .257  .256
Log-likelihood  -834.11  -339.29  -190.82  -95.02
Mean of dependent variable  43.8%  8.6%  8.3%
Absolute value of t- or z-statistics in parentheses
* significant  at 10%; **  significant at 5%;  ***  significant  at  1%
32Table 3: Determinants of Increases in civll strife
Specification/model  Means of
Persistence  Public goods  Perceptions  indep. var.
Pct. of pop. affected by strife in  1992  0.608**  0.733***  0.682***  5.7%
(2.44)  (2.86)  (2.69)
Road building within 50 km after  1997  -0.185**  -0.177**  7.5%
(2.21)  (2.11)
Percentage increase in coffee growers  0.007***  0.008***  4.6%
(2.89)  (3.42)
Poverty is a major problem  0.216***  24.0%
(3.51)
Eastern Region  -0.001  0.017  0.020  28.2%
(0.02)  (0.26)  (0.29)
Northern Region  -0.068  -0.065  -0.059  14.5%
(0.82)  (0.79)  (0.72)
Western  Region  0.270***  0.315***  0.349***  26.0%
(4.03)  (4.54)  (4.79)
Observations  371  371  361
Pseudo-R
2 0.067  0.105  0.148
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
significant at 10%; **  significant at 5%; *  significant at 1%
33Table 4: Impact of civil strife on private Investment
Specification  Means of
Probit  Tobit  indep. var.
Head's age (years)  -0.009***  0.147**  -0.147***  43.32
(5.36)  (5.64)  (5.64)
Head's age squared  O.O00***  0.00l***  0.00I**  2134
(3.14)  (2.92)  (2.91)
Head's education (years) in 1992  0.019***  0.367***  0.367***  5.27
(6.78)  (8.09)  (8.09)
Head's education squared  -0.001***  -0.014***  -0.014***  48.15
(4.03)  (4.34)  (4.34)
Assets in  1992 Qog)  -0.031***  -0.221***  -0.220***  13.28
(10.79)  (5.10)  (5.08)
No of members between 14 &  60  0.015***  0.367***  0.366***  2.54
(5.38)  (8.44)  (8.41)
No of members less than  14  0.011e**  0.236***  0.236***  2.56
(5.03)  (6.89)  (6.90)
No of members older than 60  -0.002  -0.030  -0.030  0.26
(0.21)  (0.16)  (0.16)
Urban dummy  -0.048***  -0.641***  -0.638***  22.0%
(3.59)  (3.24)  (3.22)
Presence of civil strife in 1992  -0.142***  -2.091***  -2.1330**  6.1%
(3.21)  (2.87)  (2.91)
Presence of theft in 1992  -0.008  7.3%
(0.01)
Presence of attacks in 1992  1.309  2.5%
(1.05)
Eastern region  -0.022*  -0.466**  -OA84**0  26.8%
(1.87)  (2.58)  (2.67)
Northem region  -0.124***  -2.361***  -2.383***  16.8%
(8.19)  (10.72)  (10.75)
Western region  0.037***  0.664***  0.656***  27.3%
(3.31)  (3.79)  (3.74)
Constant  14.877***  14.857***
(20.48)  (20.44)
No of observations  9248  9248  9248
Log likelihood  4340.83  -25972.18  -27298.66
Mean of dependent variable  81.4%  9.807
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; *  significant  at 5%; *  significant at 1%
34Table 5: Impact of dvil strife on enterprise starts and disappearance
Enterprise expansion  Enterprise disappearance
or startup
Education (years)  0.028***  0.027**  -0.001**  -0.00 1*
(2.59)  (2.53)  (2.06)  (1.93)
Education squared  -0.002***  0.002***  0.0002**  0.0002**
(2.71)  (2.66)  (2.16)  (2.06)
Age of household head  -0.005*00  -0.005***  0.0003***  0.0003***
(4.83)  (4.85)  (3.20)  (3.30)
Assets  in  1992 (og)  0.029***  0.029***  -0.002***  *0.002***
(3.36)  (3.39)  (2.88)  (3.04)
Affected by civil strife in 1992  -0.094**  -0.097**  0.016**  0.015**
(2.04)  (2.13)  (2.10)  (2.25)
Urban community  0.2160**  0.218***  -0.005**  -0.005***
(5.25)  (5.30)  (4.66)  (4.83)
Eastem region  -0.034  -0.036  0.005*  0.005*
(0.99)  (1.03)  (1.70)  (1.75)
Northem region  0.167***  0.162***  0.003  0.003
(3.87)  (3.74)  (0.74)  (0.84)
Westem region  -0.118***  -0.119***  0.001  0.002
(3.71)  (3.76)  (0.51)  (0.69)
Affected by theft in 1992  0.011  0.003
(0.27)  (0.95)
Affected by attacks in 1992  0.080  -0.003**
(1.06)  (2.09)
Non-farm income  1992 (log)  0.004**s  0.004***
(14A6)  (14.19)
Log likelihood  -684.905  -684.234  -152.86  -150.592
Pseudo R 2 0.082  0.094  0.737  0.741
Noofobservations  1248  1248  1248  1248
Mean of dependent variable  39.77%  18.69%
Robust z-statistics  in parentheses
'  significant at  10%; **  significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
35Appendix table 1: Determinants of theft and physical attack, Uganda 1992 and 31999
Theft  Physical attack
Cmss section  Panel  Cross section  Panel
Mean education (> 15 year olds)  0.008  0.005  0.022**  0.039**
(1.03)  (0.54)  (2.01)  (2.44)
Education squared  -0.000  -0.000  -0.002**  -0.004***
(0.48)  (0.11)  (2.02)  (2.88)
Total asset value (log)  0.008  0.005  -0.011  -0.011
(1.17)  (0.60)  (1.25)  (0.96)
Coffee growing area  0.015  0.021  0.050**  0.057*
(0.89)  (0.84)  (2.13)  (1.75)
Cotton growing area  0.023  -0.001  0.0';6  0.050
(0.67)  (0.02)  (1.26)  (0.86)
Urban area  0.009  0.015  0.003  0.027
(0.48)  (0.59)  (0.12)  (0.83)
Distance to municipality  -0.048***  -0.055***  -0.0)6  -0.017
(3.56)  (3.96)  (0.34)  (0.96)
Wealth inequality  -0.146  -0.293  0.69] **  0.589*
(0.53)  (0.92)  (2.30)  (1.90)
Ethnic fractionalization  index  0.010  -0.004  0.029  0.031
(0.64)  (0.20)  (1.37)  (1.15)
Eastem region  0.043*  0,040  0.061  0.057
(1.65)  (1.49)  (1.60)  (1.51)
Northern region  0.128***  0.121**"'  0.135***  0.137***
(4.13)  (3.66)  (3.11)  (3.08)
Western region  0.011  0.009  0.086**  0.083**
(0.44)  (0.35)  (2.31)  (2.30)
Eastern Region*Year  0.012  -0.006  0.047  0.038
(0.41)  (0.18)  (1.13)  (0.83)
Northern Region*Year  -0.052  -0.020  0.007  -0.017
(1.55)  (0.50)  (0.16)  (0.32)
Western Region*Year  -0.030  0.008  -0.039  0.022
(1.02)  (0.24)  (0.S4)  (0.49)
Year of survey  0.097***  0.097***  O.W18  0.040
(4.68)  (3.92)  (1.54)  (1.13)
Constant  -0.128  -0.072  -0.122  -0.132
(1.28)  (0.55)  (0.92)  (0.78)
Observations  1351  743  1351  743
PseudoR2 0.88  0.64  0.10  0.13
Mean of dep. variable  13.02%X,  3.71%
Absolute value oft-statistics  in parentheses
significant at 10%; **  significant at 5%; *** significant  at I%
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